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COMMENT
IMPLIED CERTIFICATION AND MATERIALITY SHOULD
BE DISTINCT ELEMENTS WHEN ASSESSING FALSE
CLAIMS ACT LIABILITY
Robert B. Vogel, M.D.t
I. INTRODUCTION
Health law attorneys who defend pharmaceutical manufacturers against
fraud allegations find themselves confronted with new and vexing
problems. The once stalwart division between classic healthcare fraud and
fraud due to the violation of drug manufacturing regulations is gone, and
defense attorneys are scrambling to respond.
t Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 8. J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2014); M.D., University of Miami (1988). Robert B. Vogel, M.D. is
a senior staff member of the Liberty University Law Review and a 2014 J.D. candidate. He is
currently a visiting student at the University of Virginia School of Law, concentrating in
health law, and a practicing ophthalmologist. Dr. Vogel graduated from the University of
Miami School of Medicine, completed residency training in ophthalmology at the University
of Virginia and fellowship training in retinal surgery at the University of Texas. He wishes to
express his deepest gratitude to his wife Lisa. He also wishes to thank Professors Joel Hesch,
Tory Lucas, and Timothy Todd, his primary editor Dustin Gaines, and Professor Isaac Buck
1. In October of 2010 GlaxoSmithKline agreed to plead guilty to charges relating to the
manufacturing of adulterated drugs at its SB Pharmco Puerto Rico, Inc. ("SB Pharmco")
facility in Puerto Rico. Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs,
GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty & Pay $750 Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Liability
Regarding Manufacturing Deficiencies at Puerto Rico Plant (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-civ-1205.html [hereinafter GlaxoSmithKline
Settlement]. The final settlement, which included criminal and civil penalties, totaled $750
million dollars. Id. The Department of Justice (DOJ) determined that several of SB
Pharmco's pharmaceuticals were contaminated with microorganisms, thus violating the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) that prohibit delivering drugs that are adulterated.
Id. "Under the FDCA, a drug is deemed adulterated if the methods used in, or the facilities or
controls used for, its manufacturing, processing, packing or holding did not conform to or
were not operated or administered in conformity with current good manufacturing practice
.... " Id. This case had been filed in federal court in Massachusetts as a qui tam action and
netted the whistleblower $96 million. Id. The U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz said of the case,
The industry has an obligation to ensure that all rules, regulations and law are
complied with[.] ... To do less erodes the public confidence and compromises
patient safety. As this investigation demonstrates, we will not tolerate corporate
attempts to profit at the expense of the ill and needy in our society-or those
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The case of United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare2 is illustrative of
this new and emerging genre of False Claims Act (FCA) cases.' The
plaintiff, a former employee of a pharmaceutical company wholly owned by
Omnicare, alleged that the defendant violated the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act's (FDCA) Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP)
regulation that prohibits the repackaging of penicillin alongside other
pharmaceuticals. The crux of the matter was this: did the defendants
violate the FCA by impliedly certifying that they would comply with the
CGMP regulation regarding penicillin when they filed claims to federal and
state health care programs for reimbursement?'
The answer to this question has ramifications for the future of healthcare
fraud enforcement that cannot be overstated. Because the FDA recognizes
that these regulations apply to a spectrum of manufacturers, the regulations
"provide[] [a] framework that all manufacturers must follow by requiring
that manufacturers develop and follow procedures and fill in the details that
are appropriate to a given device according to the current state-of-the art
manufacturing for that specific device."' Additionally the United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) can issue warning letters or initiate
other regulatory actions against a company that fails to comply with the
CGMP regulations.' In light of this, defense attorneys today are asking the
who cut corners that result in potentially dangerous consequences to
consumers.
Id.
2. United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., No. CCB-07-1283, 2012 WL
3399789, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2012).
3. The False Claims Act is located at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 with new FERA
supplements at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G).
4. United States ex rel. Rostholder, 2012 WL 3399789, at *5. The FDCA is located at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-99 and the CGMP regulations are located at 21 C.F.R. 211. The regulation
pertaining to penicillin packaging is located at 21 C.F.R. § 211.42. See 21 C.F.R. § 211.42(d)
(2004) ("Operations relating to the manufacture, processing, and packing of penicillin shall
be performed in facilities separate from those used for other drug products for human use.").
5. United States ex rel. Rostholder, 2012 WL 3399789, at *12-14.
6. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Quality Systems (QS) Regulation/Medical
Device Good Manufacturing Practices, FDA (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements/qualitysystemsregula
tions/default.htm (emphasis added).
7. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Drug Applications and Current Good
Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Regulations, FDA (Sep. 7, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/Manufacturing/ucm0900l6.htm. The FDA has a variety of
administrative remedies available to it when there is the suspicion of wrongdoing. This includes
450 [Vol. 8:449
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following question: If the regulations are meant as "guidelines" for the
pharmaceutical companies to essentially write their own rules and the FDA
can levy administrative remedies, then why are these companies being
charged with violations of the FCA?
The answer to the defense attorneys' question has high stakes. The FCA
is the government's leading weapon against healthcare fraud. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered $4.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 from
FCA cases, which included $2.4 billion from the health care arena." A total
of $6 billion in health care dollars has been recovered via the FCA since
January of 2009.9 For financial and political reasons, the government seeks
to open these new avenues to prosecute fraud and abuse in the Medicare
and Medicaid systems. 0 Implied compliance to the regulatory framework is
sight visits and a warning letter (a so-called 483 action). Id. The FDA website explains 483
actions this way.
When FDA finds that a manufacturer has significantly violated FDA
regulations, FDA notifies the manufacturer. This notification is often in the
form of a Warning Letter. The Warning Letter identifies the violation, such as
poor manufacturing practices, problems with claims for what a product can do,
or incorrect directions for use. The letter also makes clear that the company
must correct the problem and provides directions and a timeframe for the
company to inform FDA of its plans for correction. FDA then checks to ensure
that the company's corrections are adequate.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, About FDA, Transparency, FDA Basics, FDA (Jan. 4,
2010), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucml94986.htm. In Rostholder,
Omnicare had received a warning letter from the FDA about the penicillin issue after the
complaint was filed. United States ex rel. Rostholder, 2012 WL 3399789, at *6. The letter read
in part, "[FDA investigator] documented serious deviations from the Current Good
Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations. These deviations cause your drug products to
be adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) [21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)]of the
Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act." Id.
8. Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Health Care Fraud
Prevention and Enforcement Efforts Resulting in Record-breaking Recoveries Totally Nearly
$4.1 Billion (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-213.html.
9. Id.
10. Id. Attorney General Eric Holder said,
This report reflects unprecedented successes by the Departments of Justice and
Health and Human Services in aggressively preventing and combating health
care fraud, safeguarding precious taxpayer dollars and ensuring the strength of
our essential health care programs[.] We can all be proud of what's been
achieved in the last fiscal year by the department's prosecutors, analysts and
investigators - and by our partners at HHS. These efforts reflect a strong,
ongoing commitment to fiscal accountability and to helping the American
people at a time when budgets are tight.
2014] 451
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arguably the most lucrative new mechanism to hold pharmaceutical
companies liable under the FCA.1
The most controversial aspect of answering the defense attorneys'
question is: How should a court determine if the pharmaceutical company
certified compliance with a regulation (express or implied certification
theory)? And if the government had known of the false compliance, would
it have paid the claim and/or excluded the company from participation in
the program (materiality)? The answer comes by understanding what
constitutes a legally false claim under the FCA and considering the criteria
the government uses to decide if it should or should not pay claims. Part II
of this Comment provides a short primer on the FCA, and Part III provides
an exhaustive review of the circuit splits surrounding these issues. Lastly, in
Part IV this Comment argues that courts should make a sequential
determination of whether a claim is legally false and then whether that
falsity would have been material to the government's decision to pay the
claim. Part IV of this Comment argues that by separately assessing
certification and materiality courts will be following Congress' lead on how
this issue should be addressed. Congress is signaling its intention to retain
"certification" as a distinct element of FCA liability by explicitly linking the
Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) to the FCA in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and by tightening the connection between
the Stark Law and the FCA.
II. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In order to understand and evaluate the controversy concerning implied
certification and materiality, one needs to understand where these elements
fit into the larger context of the FCA. To succeed in an FCA action, the
plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
(1) made a claim (2) that was false or fraudulent (3) "knowingly" (4) seeking
payment or approval from the United States government.12
Id. Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius said,
Fighting fraud is one of our top priorities and we have recovered an
unprecedented number of taxpayer dollars[.] Our efforts strengthen the
integrity of our health care programs, and meet the President's call for a return
to American values that ensure everyone gets a fair shot, everyone does their
fair share, and everyone plays by the same rules.
Id.
11. GlaxoSmithKline Settlement, supra note 1.
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (2012). Sections 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B) are the most
commonly utilized. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(A) says, "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented,
[Vol. 8:449452
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The FCA defines "claim" as "any request or demand, whether under a
contract or otherwise, for money or property" from the United States
government. 13 Because a request for reimbursement from Medicare or
Medicaid constitutes a "claim," this element is rarely in dispute within the
context of healthcare cases.14 This Comment focuses on the second element,
that the claim was false or fraudulent, and the fourth element, that the
falsity would have been material to the government's decision to pay the
claim." A claim can be false or fraudulent in two ways. First, there are so-
called "factually false" claims, where the goods or services that the
defendant contracted with the government to provide have not been
rendered. Second, there are the two "legally false" claims that violate a
contract term, statute, or regulation with which the claimant has either
expressly or impliedly certified compliance.'"
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" and § 3729(B) says, "knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or
fraudulent claim." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B).
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2012).
14. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999).
The court determines what constitutes a claim stating:
Interpreting the last word of the phrase is fairly easy. The False Claims Act
states that a claim 'includes any request or demand for money or property'
where the government provides any portion of the money or property
requested. 31 U.S.C.A. §3729(c). In other words the False Claims Act at least
requires the presence of a claim-a call upon the government fisc-for liability
to attach.
Id. See also United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the
number of claims submitted on HCFA-1500 forms, Medicare reimbursement claim forms,
was equal to the number of claims under the Act). Congress has determined that fraud
against the government occurs when the claim is filed and that the government need not
sustain damages or pay for claim to have been considered filed. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266. In 1986 Congress stated, "The United States is
entitled to recover such forfeitures solely upon proof that false claims were made, without
proof of damages. A forfeiture may be recovered from one who submits a false claim though
no payments were made on the claim." Id.
15. See infra Parts III-IV (discussing false and fraudulent claims presented under the
FCA).
16. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss 274 F.3d 687, 696-704 (2d Cir. 2001). The
discussion of the "worthless services claim" is essentially a discussion of the "factually false"
claim because instead, "[A] worthless services claim asserts that the knowing request of
federal reimbursement for a procedure with no medical value violates the Act irrespective of
any certification." Id. at 702. Legally false claims are those where express or implied
certification is implicated. Id. at 697-700.
2014] 453
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Suppose a law school wishes to ensure compliance with a school policy
that prohibits students from cheating on final exams." As a means of
compliance, the law school instructs each student to sign an affidavit at the
end of an exam stating that the student did not give or receive help. By
signing, the student has expressly attested to his honesty. But what if the law
school's student handbook states that there shall be no cheating on final
exams? Has not any law student who merely hands in an exam impliedly
attested to his honesty?
Logically, a claim will be deemed false when the product or service at
issue fails to comply with contractual requirements between the parties.'" In
these cases, the vendor has expressly certified to the government that the
product or service conforms to the agreed upon specifications. 9 The issue
becomes more complex when the vendor violates a statute or regulation but
was not bound by an identifiable contract term to comply with that statute
or regulation. Like the law student bound by the handbook, has the vendor
impliedly certified compliance with the applicable contract term, statute or
regulation just by virtue of the fact that he has made a claim to the
government? In the perfect world there would be no need for implied
certification because government agencies would require vendors to
expressly certify compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations in
the contract itself. But this is not the case.20 Implied certification theory,
used in this way, has the potential to significantly broaden FCA liability by
forcing the vendor to comply with statutes or regulations that were not
explicitly part of his contract.
17. This hypothetical is modeled after the one discussed by the court in United States v.
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. See United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc.,
800 F. Supp. 2d 143, 154-55 (D.D.C. 2011).
18. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972). In Aerodex, false
claims liability was assessed against a manufacturer of ball bearings, who knowingly supplied
non-conforming goods to the government. Id. at 1006. Aerodex, Inc. claimed that, although
the ball bearings did not meet the agreed upon specifications, it supplied the military with
the same basic performance characteristics as a conforming product. Id. at 1007. Aerodex
did not deny that the bearings that it supplied to the government were reworked versions of
another bearing that rendered the two indistinguishable to the naked eye. Id. Industry
standards allowed either ball bearing to be used in the specific engine that was the subject of
the contract. Id. The court, nevertheless, found that Aerodex's deliberate mislabeling of a
part specifically named in the contract compelled a finding of liability under the FCA. Id. at
1012.
19. Id.
20. See generally Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied Certification Under the False
Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2011).
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In 2009, as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA),
Congress amended the FCA to expressly include a "materiality"
requirement.2 1 The revised FCA defined "materiality" as "having a natural
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt
of money or property."22 By adding the "materiality" requirement in §
3729(a)(1)(B) and defining it, Congress helped to resolve part of the circuit
split on this issue. As will be reviewed in Part III, prior to the FERA
amendments that defined "materiality," there were circuits that declined to
read a materiality element into the statute at all.23 This Comment argues
that even though Congress added the "materiality" element under FERA it
did not intend to envelope false certification theory under the materiality
umbrella.24
The FCA contains several qui tam25 provisions that enable a private
party, known as a relator, to file a lawsuit on behalf of the government.26
The government might never detect certain fraudulent activity were it not
for cases initiated by current or former employees of companies who have
information by virtue of their insider status.27
21. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) ("knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved
by the Government") with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2010) ("knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim"). It should be noted that the word "material" is found in § 3729(a)(1)(B) but not in §
3729(a)(1)(A). This is because § 3729(a)(1)(A) is used for claims that are factually false, and
it is assumed that these claims would be "material" to the government's decision to pay the
claimant.
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
23. See United States ex rel. A+ Homecare Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Grp. Inc., 400 F.3d
428, 445 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[tlhe circuits which have addressed the issue of
materiality are inconsistent on the standard to be used"). See discussion infra Part III.
24. See Monica P. Navarro, Materiality: A Needed Return to Basics in False Claim Act
Liability, 43 U. MEM. L. REv. 105 (2012) (discussing the belief that implied certification
theory should be enveloped by a materiality analysis).
25. The term "qui tam" is "short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
se ipso in hac parte sequitar, which means 'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's
behalf as well as his own."' Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(h) (2012).
27. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268-69
("[M]ost fraud goes undetected due to the failure of Governmental agencies to effectively
ensure accountability on the part of program recipients and Government contractors ....
Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are either
close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity.").
2014] 455
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Part III of this Comment is a comprehensive presentation of the key
cases from each circuit that invoke both express and implied certification
theory. The charts included in this Comment catalog the cases and
important holdings from the decisions in each circuit.28 These charts are
meant to serve as an initial reference for the reader who wishes to
understand the circuits' positions, and who may then delve into Part III for
a brief on the particular case.
III. BACKGROUND
A. False Certification
1. Express False Certification
a. First Circuit
(1) U.S. ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc.29
The relator alleged that Blackstone engaged in a nationwide kickback
scheme to induce hospitals and physicians to submit materially false or
fraudulent claims to Medicare.30 He argued that compliance with the Anti-
Kickback Statute (AKS)" is a precondition for Medicare reimbursement
and that causing doctors and hospitals to submit claims that did not comply
with the AKS made the claims false or fraudulent.32 The court rejected the
relator's argument that, in the absence of express legal representation or
factual misstatement, a claim can only be false or fraudulent if it fails to
comply with a precondition of payment expressly stated in a statute or
regulation." The court refused to adopt the construct of express or implied
certification as a way of addressing such an argument. 34 Instead it chose to
look at this issue by determining if the claim misrepresented compliance
with a precondition of payment and then addressed whether those
28. See infra Chart 1, Chart 2.
29. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011).
30. Id. at 378.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). The AKS prohibits the payment and receipt of
kickbacks in return for either procuring or recommending the procurement of a good,
facility, or item to be paid in whole or in part by a federal healthcare program. Id.
32. United States ex reL Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 379.
33. Id.
34. Id.
[Vol. 8:449456
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misrepresentations were material." In this case the "misrepresentations"
were adequate to trigger FCA liability. 6 The court concluded, "[t]his
holding is consistent with those of other courts that have found claims false
or fraudulent for non-compliance with a contract term."" Refusing to label
this "express compliance," the court nonetheless looked at the contract
terms and determined that they were adequately specific to demand
compliance."
(2) New York ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc."
In this case, decided soon after Blackstone, the relator alleged that
Amgen, Inc. employed a kickback scheme that induced physicians to file
false or fraudulent claims to the states' Medicaid programs.40 The court
employed the same analysis as it did in Blackstone, refusing to adopt the
term "express certification."" The court looked closely at the regulatory
regime governing each of the Medicaid programs in question and decided
that "the absence of such kickbacks is a precondition of being entitled to
payment under these Medicaid programs, [and that] the reimbursement
claims submitted to the four programs 'represented that there had been
compliance with a material precondition of payment that had not been
met."'42 The court dismissed the relator's claims referable to the Georgia
Medicaid regime, however, because no language was found that
preconditioned payment on alleged kickbacks.43 While eschewing the term
"express certification," the First Circuit tied the express wording of
regulatory language to certification of false claims.
35. Id. at 392.
36. Id. at 392-93. The court looked specifically at the Provider Agreement and the
Hospital Cost Report Forms that the providers signed as a prerequisite to payment from
Medicare. Id. at 381. The Provider Agreement required, inter alia, that the provider
"understand that payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the claim and the
underlying transaction complying with [Medicare's] laws, regulations, and program
instructions." Id. The Agreement specifically mentioned AKS as one of the regulations. Id.
37. Id. at 394.
38. Id. at 393.
39. New York ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 652 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, No. 11-363 (R46-005), 2011 WL 4403614 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2011).
40. Id. at 105.
41. Id. at 109-15.
42. Id. at 113 (quoting United States ex rel. Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 392).
43. Id. at 116.
2014] 457
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b. Second Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss'
In Mikes, a physician brought a qui tam suit against her former partner
physicians for submitting fraudulent Medicare claims.4 ' The relator's cause
of action was that the defendants submitted false claims for reimbursement
for unreliable spirometry services. 6 Dr. Mikes claimed that the spirometers
were improperly calibrated; therefore, the results of the test were
unreliable." The relator claimed that when the defendants submitted claims
to Medicare they expressly certified compliance with the terms set out on
the reimbursement form.48 The court agreed that an expressly false claim is
"a claim that falsely certifies compliance with a particular statute, regulation
or contractual term, where compliance is a prerequisite to payment.""
Nevertheless, the court did not agree with Dr. Mikes that the reliability of
the spirometry measurements were expressly required by the wording of the
reimbursement form.so
c. Third Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc."
In Kosenske, anesthesiologists brought a qui tam action under the FCA
against the Carlisle Hospital and Health System alleging that the defendants
submitted outpatient claims to Medicare falsely certifying that the claims
were in compliance with the Stark and Anti-Kickback Acts.52 In finding for
the relator, the court concluded that "[flalsely certifying compliance with
the Stark or Anti-Kickback Acts in connection with a claim submitted to a
federally funded insurance program is actionable under the FCA."5
44. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
45. Id. at 693.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 694.
48. Id. at 698. The "Form HCFA-1500 expressly says: 'I certify that the services shown
on this form were medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient . . .. ' Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 699.
51. United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2009).
52. Id. at 88.
53. Id. at 94.
[Vol. 8:449458
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(2) United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc.'
More recently in United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group,
Inc. the Third Circuit affirmed that there is express false certification
liability under the FCA, citing Kosenske.5 The Wilkins court stated, "Under
the 'express false certification' theory, an entity was liable under the FCA
for falsely certifying that it is in compliance with regulations which are
prerequisites to Government payment in connection with the claim for
payment of federal funds."'
d. Fourth Circuit
(1) Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co."
In Harrison, the relator brought a claim alleging that the defendants
misrepresented both the need for a subcontractor and the price of the
subcontract for work they were doing for the Department of Energy
(DOE)." Westinghouse Savannah River Company (Westinghouse) also
falsely certified that no conflict of interest existed between itself and the
subcontractor." The relator claimed this was done in order to get approval
from the DOE for the subcontract work.60 The court said, "The False Claims
Act is intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might
result in financial loss to the Government."" The Harrison court went on to
say that the False Claims Act is violated "when a government contract or
program required compliance with certain conditions as a prerequisite to a
government benefit, payment or program; the defendant failed to comply
with those conditions; and the defendant falsely certified that it had
complied . .. ."62 The court held that Harrison sufficiently alleged that
Westinghouse made intentional misrepresentations to the government and
54. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295 (3d Cir.
2011).
55. Id. at 306.
56. Id. at 305 (citing Rodriguez v. Our Lady of Lourdes Med. Ctr., 552 F.3d 297, 303 (3d
Cir. 2008)).
57. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1999).
58. Id. at 780.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 788 (citing United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
62. Id. at 786.
2014] 459
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submitted a certification known to be false about matters that were material
to the decision to grant a subcontract.63
(2) United States ex rel. Godfrey v. KBR6
In Godfrey, the relator alleged that KBR violated the FCA by paying
inflated invoices submitted to it by subcontractors and then seeking
payment from the government based on these increased payments.65 The
court here agreed with the Harrison court that express certification was
operative when the defendant failed to comply with conditions that served
as prerequisites to obtaining a government payment." In this case, however,
the relator failed to support his claim of improper billing, and he failed to
demonstrate that KBR made payments with knowledge that the recipients
were not entitled to such payments.7
e. Fifth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp.
In Thompson, the relator alleged that the defendants falsely certified that
annual cost reports were in compliance with the Anti-Kickback and Stark
Statutes.6' The court distinguished claims for service that violate statutes,
which do not necessarily constitute false claims under the FCA,o from false
certifications of compliance when certification is a prerequisite for
obtaining a government benefit.71 The court stated, "[W]here the
government has conditioned payment of a claim upon a claimant's
certification of compliance with, for example, a statute or regulation, a
claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies
compliance with that statute or regulation."72 The court did not agree with
Thompson that in this case the retention of any payment received prior to
63. Id. at 794.
64. United States ex rel. Godfrey v. KBR, 360 F. App'x 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
65. Id. at 408.
66. Id. at 412.
67. Id.
68. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899
(5th Cir. 1997).
69. Id. at 900-01.
70. Id. at 902.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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submission of the annual report was conditioned on the certification of
compliance with Medicare statutes.
(2) United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc.'
In Steury, the relator alleged that the defendant submitted a false or
fraudulent claim within the meaning of the FCA by accepting payment
from the government after selling the Veteran Administration an unsafe
intravenous fluid infusion device." Although this case was presented by the
relator on the implied certification theory, the court relied on Thompson,
reaffirming the Fifth Circuit's view on express certification.'
f. Sixth Circuit
(1) Chesborough v. VPA, P.C.
In Chesborough, the relator was a radiologist who provided x-ray
interpretation services to the defendant, a home health provider.7 1
Chesborough alleged that VPA filed false or fraudulent claims because the
tests "were either not properly documented as to indication, were
performed with equipment that did not conform to industry standards[,] or
were administered by inadequately trained radiology technologists."7 ' The
court noted that Chesborough was not bringing these claims because "VPA
expressly certified that its studies complied with industry standards."" The
court notes that situations do exist where the FCA covers failure to comply
with a regulation submitted to the government." "When a claim expressly
states that it complies with a particular statute, regulation, or contractual
term that is a prerequisite for payment, failure to actually comply would
render the claim fraudulent."82
73. Id.
74. United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2010).
75. Id. at 265-66.
76. Id. at 267-68.
77. Chesborough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011).
78. Id. at 464.
79. Id. at 465.
80. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697-99 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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g. Seventh Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Gross v. Aids Research Alliance-
Chicago"
In Gross, the relator was a participant in a National Institutes of Health
(NIH) research study conducted by the defendants." Gross claimed that
"[i]ndividually, and in cumulative effect, the forms, written reports, and
study results submitted by the defendants constituted certifications of
compliance with all requirements and conditions of the research grant.""
The court found that Gross had not pleaded with the specificity necessary to
state a claim because his complaint failed to describe how any of the
"forms" that the defendants filed related to payments of grant money from
the NIH. 6 The court stated that "where an FCA claim is based upon an
alleged false certification of regulatory compliance, the certification must be
a condition of the government payment in order to be actionable.""
(2) United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics"
In Yannacopoulos, the relator claimed that the defendants violated the
FCA by making false statements to the government to obtain payment for
the sale of F-16 fighter planes to Greece." The sale of the planes was
conducted under the United States' Foreign Military Financing Program.o
Under that program, Greece bought the fighters directly from General
83. United States ex rel. Gross v. Aids Research Alliance-Chi., 415 F.3d 601 (7th Cir.
2005).
84. Id. at 603.
85. Id. at 604 (quoting from the plaintiffs second amended complaint).
86. Id. at 604-05.
87. Id. at 605 (citing United States ex rel. Lamers v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013
(7th Cir. 1999)). While discussing regulatory violations that do not rise to the level of an
FCA violation the court says: "[T]hat minor technical regulatory violations do not make a
claim 'false' for purposes of the FCA; the existence of mere technical regulatory violations
tends to undercut any notion that a prior representation of regulatory compliance was
knowingly and falsely made in order to deceive the government." Id. at 604 (citing Lamers,
168 F.3d at 1019). The court also cites to United States ex rel. Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp. Id.; United States ex rel. Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.
1999).
88. United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2011).
89. Id. at 821-23.
90. Id. at 821.
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Dynamics, but it did so using funds that were loaned by the United States."
Before the United States government would release funds to General
Dynamics, it required the company to sign a certification agreement
containing representations regarding the Greek sale.92 On the invoices to
the government for payment of the Greek sale, General Dynamics certified
compliance with its contract and the certification agreement.93 The court
pointed out that in the Seventh Circuit, a breach of contract claim does not
give rise to FCA claims." Nevertheless, if the defendant falsely claims to be
in compliance with a contract to obtain payment, it may be an actionable
claim under the FCA." Such a statement would be a "legally false request
for payment""' after an express certification of compliance with a contract.97
h. Eighth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet"
In Vigil, the relator alleged that Nelnet-a company formed to perform
collection services and present claims to the Department of Education
(DOE) for interest subsidies, special allowances, and insurance payments on
defaulted student loans-filed false claims to the government."
Participation in this program was conditioned on compliance with DOE
regulations.o Vigil claimed that Nelnet's claims for reimbursement under
these programs "included materially false certifications of compliance with
[DOE] regulations that were conditions of payment for those claims."'
91. Id.
92. Id. at 824.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374 (7th
Cir.2003)).
95. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163
(10th Cir. 2010)). In noting this important contrast the court here cites to two Tenth Circuit
cases. See Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1163; United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health
Center, Inc., 543 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2008).
96. Id. (quoting Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1168).
97. Id.
98. United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet 639 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2011).
99. Id. at 794-95.
100. Id. at 795.
101. Id. at 797 (internal quotation marks omitted). The certification by Nelnet read: "The
information in this claim is true and accurate and that the loan(s) included in the claim was
(were) made, disbursed . . . and serviced in compliance with all federal regulations and
appropriate guarantor rules. Id.
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The court made a distinction between regulatory violations that were
conditions only of participation in the programs and false certifications that
were conditions of payment. 102 The court said that express false certification
is "actionable under the FCA only if it leads the government to make a
payment which it would not otherwise have made."'
i. Ninth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton'
In Hopper, the relator was the employee of a school district that allegedly
was conducting evaluations of special education students in violation of the
California Education Code.' The court found that the forms the school
district submitted for payment did not contain any certification of
regulatory compliance.0 6 Therefore, false certification theory did not apply
because liability is only created "when certification is a prerequisite to
obtaining a government benefit."' 7 The Ninth Circuit endorsed the express
certification theory but held that it was not applicable to this case.0
(2) United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix'09
In Hendow, the defendant was charged with filing false claims that
violated subsidies under Title IV and the Higher Education Act."o The
relator alleged that when the University of Phoenix entered into the
Program Participation Agreement with the Department of Education it
agreed to "abide by a panoply of statutory, regulatory, and contractual
requirements. One of these requirements is a ban on incentive
compensation: a ban on the institution's paying recruiters on a per-student
basis.""' The court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's approach to express
102. Id. at 799.
103. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211, 1219 (10th Cir.2008)).
104. United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996).
105. Id. at 1263.
106. Id. at 1267.
107. Id. 1266.
108. Id. at 1266-67. The court notes that "absent actionable false certifications upon
which funding is conditioned, the False Claims Act does not provide such a remedy." Id. at
1267.
109. United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
110. Id. at 1168-69.
111. Id.
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certification as discussed in Anton."2 It stated, "[Tihe question is merely
whether the false certification-or assertion, or statement-was relevant to
the government's decision to confer a benefit."l 3 The court held that
eligibility for payment under Title IV and the Higher Education Act was
explicitly conditioned on compliance with the incentive compensation
ban."' In upholding the express certification theory as it applied to the
University of Phoenix, the court noted that "[t]hese are not ambiguous
exhortations of an amorphous duty. The statute, regulation, and agreement
here all explicitly condition participation and payment on compliance with,
among other things, the precise requirement that relators allege that the
University knowingly disregarded.""'
j. Tenth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr.,
Inc." 6
In Conner, the relator was an ophthalmologist who claimed that the
defendant hospital expressly certified compliance with Medicare laws and
regulations and violated those certifications by filing false annual cost
reports."' Because Medicare law did not contain a provision that required
compliance with the annual cost report, Conner proceeded under an
express certification theory, even though he conceded that the Medicare
laws did not contain a condition of compliance within the annual cost
report." 8 Conner urged the court to look at the annual cost reports standing
alone and the explicit certifications found in them that conditioned
payment on Medicare statutes and regulations."9 The court rejected this
expansive view of false express certification and said: "When an [sic] the
express certification does not state that compliance is a prerequisite to
payment, we must look to the underlying statutes to surmise if they make
the certification a condition of payment."'20 The court rejected Conner's
112. Id. at 1172.
113. Id. at 1173.
114. Id. at 1175.
115. Id. at 1176.
116. United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir.
2008).
117. Id. at 1214.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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argument that "any failure by SRHC to comply with any underlying
Medicare statute or regulation during the provision of any Medicare-
reimbursable service renders this certification false, and the resulting
payments fraudulent." 2' The court concluded that express certification
leads to actionable claims under the FCA only if it "leads the government to
make a payment which it would not otherwise have made."'22 Put another
way, the "false statement must be material to the government's decision to
pay out moneys to the claimant."'23 Thus, Conner's allegations concerning
the annual reports failed.'24
(2) United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc.12 5
In Lemmon, the relator alleged that Envirocare of Utah, Inc.
("Envirocare") violated its contractual and regulatory obligations to the
federal government by improperly disposing of waste.'2 ' The false claims
arose when Envirocare submitted invoices for payment that contained
certifications that it had fulfilled its obligations under the contract.127 The
court noted that the express certification theory makes a claim actionable
under the FCA only if it "leads the government to make a payment which,
absent the falsity, it may not have made."'28 Here, the relator's claims were
dismissed because of failure to state legally sufficient claims with the
requisite specificity.129
121. Id. at 1219 ("[L]iability [under the FCA] does not arise merely because a false
statement is included within a claim, but rather the claim itself must be false or fraudulent."
(quoting United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 400 F.3d
428, 443 (6th Cir. 2005))).
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2006)). The court goes on to make the distinction between conditions of program
participation and conditions of payment. Id. at 1220 (citing United States ex rel. Gross v.
AIDS Research Alliance-Chi., 415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d
687, 701-02 (2d Cir. 2001)). The court's distinction is that conditions of participation are
enforced through administrative mechanisms, while conditions of payment might cause the
government to actually refuse payment, if it knew the conditions were not being followed. Id.
124. Id. at 1121.
125. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir
2010).
126. Id. at 1166.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1169.
129. Id. at 1173.
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k. Eleventh Circuit
There are no applicable cases from the Eleventh Circuit.
1. D.C. Circuit
(1) United States v. Science Applications International Corp. 30
In this case, the government alleged that Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) violated contractual obligations that
required it to "forego entering into consulting or other contractual
arrangements with any firm or organization, the result of which may give
rise to a conflict of interest with respect to the work being performed under
the contract."'31 Additionally, the contract required that SAIC would certify
adherence to regulations that required the listing of any potential conflicts
of interest.132 SAIC was hired by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) to provide expertise to support the agency's rulemaking concerning
recycled, radioactively contaminated materials from nuclear facilities."' The
court denied the government's claims with respect to express certification
on two grounds."4 First, the reports submitted by SAIC made no reference
to whether the company had complied with conflict of interest
requirements."' Second, the government never stated that SAIC's "separate
express contractual certifications were themselves request[s] or demand[s]
for money so as to fall within the statute's definition of claim."'36 This case
was decided on implied certification theory."
(2) United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services., Inc."'
In this case, the government charged that Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR)
knowingly billed for the cost of private security contractors in Iraq, an
130. United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 1262 (quoting the 1992 contract between the government and SAIC).
132. Id. 48 C.F.R. § 2009.570-3(b) (1999) lists the potential conflicting "situations and
relationships." Id.
133. Id. at 1261-62.
134. Id. at 1267.
135. Id.
136. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 1268-71.
138. United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C.
2011).
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expense that the government had expressly forbidden in its contract."9 The
court stated that "express false certification occurs when the claimant
explicitly represents that he or she has complied with a contractual
condition, but in fact has not complied." 40 In this case, the court ruled that
the government's express false certification theory arguments were really
routine breach of contract claims."' According to the court, the
government conflated claims that were "false" with claims that were simply
"disallowed" by the contract.142 This case was decided on implied
certification theory."'
m. Federal Circuit
There are no applicable cases in this circuit.
2. Implied False Certification
a. Early cases exemplifying implied false certification
(1) United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc. '
An early case that concerned the notion of implied certification was
United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc. In Pogue, the qui
tam plaintiff alleged that a scheme existed involving the referral of Medicare
and Medicaid patients to the defendant's hospital in violation of the Anti-
Kickback and Self-Referral statutes."' The relator argued that even though
the claims for which the defendant sought payment were correctly billed
and medically necessary, the fact that they submitted a Medicare claim
carried the implied certification that that were complying with all aspects of
the federal Medicare statutes.'46
139. Id. at 147.
140. Id. at 154 (quoting Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001)). The court
fashions an informative analogy saying that express false certification is like a student who
hands in a signed essay expressly certifying that it was his own work and yet it was taken
from another source. Id. at 154-55. Implied false certification is when the same essay is
handed in, but the falsity lies not on the fact that he signed it, but that a school guideline
requires that all submissions be the student's own work. Id.
141. Id. at 154.
142. Id. at 155.
143. Id. at 155-59.
144. United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D.
Tenn. 1996).
145. Id. at 1508.
146. Id. at 1509.
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The court agreed with Pogue and said that not disclosing violations of
the other statutes demonstrated the intent to cause the government to pay
claims that it would not have paid had it been aware of the violations.14 For
the first time in the Medicare context, the court agreed that a provider
submitting facially correct claims could be held liable under the FCA
because of a violation of a second, related federal statute.44 The court
agreed that Pogue stated a claim under the FCA when he argued that "the
defendants concealed their illegal activities from the government in an
effort to defraud the government into paying Medicare claims it would not
have otherwise paid."49
b. First Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical,
Inc.150
The relator alleged that Blackstone engaged in a nationwide kickback
scheme to induce hospitals and physicians to submit materially false or
fraudulent claims to Medicare.'- The relator argued that compliance with
the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) is a precondition for Medicare
reimbursement and that causing doctors and hospitals to submit claims that
did not comply with the AKS made the claims false or fraudulent.152 The
court rejected the argument that in the absence of express legal
misrepresentation or factual misstatement, a claim can only be false or
fraudulent if it fails to comply with a precondition of payment expressly
stated in a statute or regulation.' But, the court refused to adopt the
construct of express or implied certification as a way of addressing such an
argument. Instead the court looked at this issue by determining if the claim
misrepresented compliance with a precondition of payment and then by
addressing whether those misrepresentations were material." The court
said the claims in this case "represented that there had been compliance
with a material precondition of payment that had not been met. We do not
147. Id. at 1513.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011).
151. Id. at 378.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 379.
154. Id. at 392.
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categorize this representation as one of law or fact, nor do we categorize it
as either express or implied.""' The court went on to say that it "first
address[ed] whether the claims at issue here misrepresented compliance
with a precondition of payment so as to be false or fraudulent and then
address[ed] whether those misrepresentations were material.""' In this case
the "misrepresentations" were adequate to trigger FCA liability.157
c. Second Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss's
In Mikes, a physician brought a qui tam action against her former
partner physicians for submitting fraudulent Medicare claims. Mikes
alleged that the defendants submitted false claims for reimbursement for
unreliable spirometry services.' 9 Mikes claimed that the spirometers were
improperly calibrated and, therefore, the results of the test were
unreliable.'60 Mikes claimed that when the defendants submitted claims to
Medicare they expressly certified compliance with the terms set out on the
reimbursement form.'6 ' The court agreed that an expressly false claim is a
claim that falsely certifies compliance with a particular statute, regulation,
or contractual term where compliance is a prerequisite to payment.'6 2
Nevertheless, the court disagreed that the reliability of the spirometry
measurements was expressly required by the reimbursement form.'6
Mikes also asked the court to address these claims under the theory of
implied false certification. 164 In its analysis, the court recounted the holding
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 392-93. The court looked specifically at the Provider Agreement and the
Hospital Cost Report Forms that the providers signed as a prerequisite to payment from
Medicare. Id. at 381. The Provider Agreement required, inter alia, the provider "understand
that payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the claim and the underlying
transaction complying with [Medicare's] laws, regulations and programs instructions." Id.
The Agreement specifically mentioned AKS as one of the regulations. Id.
158. United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
159. Id. at 693.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 698. The Form HCFA-1500 expressly says: "I certify that the services shown on
this form were medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient ..... Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 699.
164. Id.
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of the Federal Claims Court in Ab-Tech Construction v. United States.'6 5 In
Ab-Tech Construction, the court upheld the concept of implied certification
in the context of a federal small business statutory program.'6 6 The Mikes
court distinguished Ab-Tech by saying that the Ab-Tech rationale "did not
fit comfortably into the health care context" and "the False Claims Act was
not designed as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all medical
regulations-but rather only those that are a precondition to payment."' 7
The Mikes court then stated, "Specifically, implied certification is
appropriately applied only when the underlying statute or regulation upon
which the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order
to be paid."' 8 The court concluded that "liability under the Act may
properly be found therefore when a defendant submits a claim for
reimbursement while knowing-as that term is defined by the Act-that
payment expressly is precluded because of some noncompliance by the
defendant."' 9
The court's ruling on Mikes's specific allegations are instructive in
understanding how the court applied these criteria. Mikes alleged implied
certification of claims with reference to two Medicare statutes-§§
1395y(a)(1)(A) and 1320c-5(a).' The § 1395 statute states that "no
payment may be made under [the Medicare statute] for any expenses
incurred for items or services. . . .""' The court said that because the § 1395
statute "contains an express condition of payment-that is, 'no payment
may be made'-it explicitly links each Medicare payment to the
requirement that the particular item or service be reasonable and
necessary."17 2
The § 1320 statute states, "[I]t shall be the obligation of a practitioner
who provides a medical service for which payment may be made .. . to
165. Ab-Tech Constr. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (Fed. Cl. 1994), affd, 57 F.3d 1084
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
166. Id. at 433-34.
167. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699. Interestingly, the court premised this argument on the idea
of federalism. Id. at 700. The Mikes court said that governments at the state and local level
are the best places to resolve health care issues of this type. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 700 (citation omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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assure compliance with the section.""' The court said that here "the
structure of the statute informs us that § 1320c-5(a) establishes conditions
of participation, rather than prerequisites to receiving reimbursement." 74
Thus under the Mikes formulation, it is the express condition of payment of
claims based on certification with a regulation, not conditions of
participation in the program, that is the key to assessing FCA liability.17 1
(2) United States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp.76
The Second Circuit again addressed implied certification in Kirk, this
time in a non-medical claims setting. In Kirk, the qui tam plaintiff claimed
that his former employer, Schindler Elevator Corporation, obtained
government contracts under the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment
Assistance Act ("VEVRAA")' 7 ' and then either failed to file or falsified
VETS-100 reports." The applicable statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1354(a)(1),
provides that "no agency may obligate or expend funds" to enter a contract
covered by VEVRAA when the contractor has not submitted a VETS-100
report."' The Kirk court firmly adopted the Mikes court's formulation of
implied certification, agreeing that "implied certification is appropriately
applied only when the underlying statute or regulation upon which the
plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order to be
paid."' Kirk stated a valid claim because 31 U.S.C. § 1354(a)(1) did
expressly state that, in order to be paid in compliance with VETS-100,
reporting was required, and Schindler had impliedly certified compliance
when it accepted the contract.'
173. Id. at 701.
174. Id. at 701-02.
175. Id. at 702.
176. United States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 601 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2010).
177. Id. at 100. 38 U.S.C. § 4212 requires contractors doing business with the federal
government to submit annual "VETS-100 Reports" to the Secretary of Labor providing
information about the number of veterans employed by the contractor. Id. at 99.
178. Id. at 98.
179. Id. at 115.
180. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700.
181. Kirk, 601 F.3d at 115.
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(3) United States ex rel. Feldman v. City of New York'8 2
Feldman is a recently decided case from the Southern District of New
York, within the Second Circuit, that applies the implied certification
principles of Mikes and Kirk in the healthcare setting. In Feldman, the
United States government-acting intervenor in this qui tam action-
alleged that the City of New York filed false claims in administration of the
Personal Care Services ("PCS") program under Medicaid.' The court
carefully parsed the language of the applicable statute and decided that the
payment was expressly predicated on the compliance with the Department
of Health Regulation that addressed PCS."' The defendants here argued
that they, like the Mikes defendants, should be exonerated because they filed
reimbursement forms that did not expressly implicate implied certification
with the applicable regulation.'" The Feldman court disagreed, stating that
"the Government allegations here relate not to whether a medical provider
provided the appropriate level of care [as in Mikes], but whether the City
impliedly represented its compliance with the fundamental procedural
requirements governing the approval of PCS benefits under New York State
Law." 86
d. Third Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc. 87
The Third Circuit adopted express false certification liability under the
FCA in its 2009 decision in United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA,
182. United States ex rel. Feldman v. City of New York, 808 F. Supp. 2d 641 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
183. Id. at 644-48.
184. Id. at 651. The PCS program regulations are found in Department of Health Reg. §
505.14.18. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.14 (2012). The court here specifically
mentions § 505.14(b). Feldman, F. Supp. 2d at 651. This section is called "Criteria and
authorization for provision of services." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 505.14.
Section 505.14(b)(1) reads, "When the local services department receives a request for
services, that department shall determine the applicant's eligibility for medical assistance."
Id. Section 505.14(b)(2) reads, "The initial authorization for personal care services must be
based on the following." Id. (emphasis added). It is this "based on" language in this
regulation that the Feldman court uses to state: "[U]nder federal law, a claimant is entitled to
PCS benefits only if those benefits are, in fact, "based on" the considerations enumerated in
DOH Reg. § 505.14(b)(2)." Feldman, F. Supp. 2d at 651.
185. Id. at 652.
186. Id. at 654.
187. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Inc.' The court in Wilkins reaffirmed the ruling in Kosenske and addressed
implied certification for the first time in the Third Circuit.'89 Wilkins
alleged that United Health Group violated the FCA by claiming compliance
with Anti-Kickback Statutes and marketing regulations inherent in
Medicare Advantage ("MA") plans.190
The Third Circuit adopted the concept of implied false certification for
liability under the FCA after noting that a majority of other circuits had
done so."' But the court also put limitations on how expansively it was
willing to apply the implied certification theory, especially in the federally
funded health care arena.192 The court agreed with the Mikes court
formulation and chose to limit implied certification to "only those
regulations that are a precondition to payment ... ."' The court
summarized its holding by saying that "under this theory a plaintiff must
show that if the Government had been aware of the defendant's violations
of the Medicare laws and regulations that are the bases of a plaintiffs FCA
claims, it would not have paid the defendant's claims."'94 The court
concluded that Wilkins's complaint met these implied certification
standards.' The court said that United Health Care knowingly received
188. United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009).
189. Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 306.
190. Id. at 300.
191. Id. at 306. The court notes that as of June, 2011, the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits had adopted implied certification. Id. The court
gives two reasons for adopting implied certification theory. First, the court says that the
express, Congressionally stated purpose for the FCA was to ferret out all attempts to cause
the government to pay out money for property or services that were not delivered. Id. The
court stated that "a false claim may take many forms, the most common being a claim for
goods or services not provided, or provided in violation of contract terms, specifications,
statute or regulation...." S. REP. No. 99-345, at 9 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274.
The second justification for adopting the implied certification theory was a comparison
between 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) and 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). The Third Circuit said that
"section 3729(a)(1), when compared with section 3729(a)(2), indicates that a plaintiff can
bring a claim under the FCA even without evidence that a claimant for Government funds
made an express false statement in order to obtain those funds." Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 306-07
(emphasis added).
192. Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 307.
193. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 313.
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payment from the government in violation of the AKS, which they deemed
an explicit precondition to payment under Medicare.' 6
e. Fourth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala.197
Pamela Berge was a graduate student at the University of Alabama-
Birmingham (UAB) when she brought this qui tam suit against the
University alleging that it had violated the False Claims Act by making false
statements to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in an annual progress
report for its grant."' The Fourth Circuit decided this case based on what it
called the "materiality" of the claims.'99 The court defined materiality as"whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence agency
action or is capable of influencing agency action."200 The court here reversed
the lower court, finding that Berge failed to carry her of burden of showing
that UAB's statements were material to NIH's decision to supply grant
money.2 01
(2) United States ex rel. Hererra v. Danka Office Imaging Co.2 02
Danka Office Imaging Company ("Danka") held a federal contract that
obligated it to pay the government a "Fee for Service" (FFS) percentage
based on all sales made under the contract.203 Hererra claimed that Danka
violated the False Claims Act by failing to file its quarterly FFS reports to
196. Id.
197. United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir.
1997).
198. Id. at 1456.
199. Id. at 1459. In this case, the court does not refer to certification as a means of
determining whether the allegedly false statements made by UAB were utilized by the NIH to
influence payment. The court looked to the criminal law to determine that "materiality"
should be applied in civil cases. Id. The court goes on to say that the determination of
whether a fact is "material" is a matter of law and not one for the jury. Id. at 1459-60.
200. Id. (quoting United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116, 1122 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
201. Id. at 1462. "Assuming arguendo that all of Berge's allegations were true and UAB
had made these false statements, it is hard to imagine that NIH's decision-making would
have been influenced by them." Id.
202. United States ex rel. Hererra v. Danka Office Imaging Co., 91 Fed. Appx. 862 (4th
Cir. 2004).
203. Id. at 862-63.
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the government.204 Herrara's first theory of liability was that each invoice
that Danka submitted to the government was a "direct false claim" because
they included the FFS that Danka was ultimately not going to pay.205 The
court disagreed that this represented a false claim because, while Danka was
required to include the FFS on all its statements and the failure to pay the
FFS may have been a breach of contract, the inclusion of the FFS on the
invoice was not a false claim.206
The court also disagreed with Hererra that Danka's submissions were
false by implied certification theory.207 The court emphasized that, in order
for implied certification to validly apply, the false claim must be a
prerequisite for the government's decision to pay.208 The court said that the
government's decision to pay Danka was not predicated on the condition
that Danka remit the FFS payment.209 The court, referring to its ruling in
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Company,210 stated, "We have
previously noted that claims of implied certification were 'questionable' in
this circuit. Given our resolution of this issue we need not decide whether
claims for implied certification are viable under the False Claims Act.""
204. Id. at 863.
205. Id. at 864.
206. Id. The court utilized the "direct false claim" formula from Harrison v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co. Id. (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776,
784-85 (4th Cir. 1999)). The claimant must show the defendant "made a claim for payment
or approval by the government, that the claim was false or fraudulent, that [Danka] acted
"knowingly" in presenting the false claim, and that the falsity was material." Id. (quoting
Harrison, 176 F.3d at 784-85).
207. Id. at 865.
208. Id. at 864.
209. Id. at 865. The court utilized the implied certification analysis from Harrison v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co. Id. (citing Harrison, 176 F.3d at 786, 786 n.8). Quoting
Harrison, the court said that "[t]o the extent that the theory is valid, the theory of implied
certification creates liability under § 3729(a)(1) where 'submission of invoices and
reimbursement forms constituted implied certifications of compliance with the terms of the
particular government program."' Id. at 864 (quoting Harrison, 176 F.3d at 786, 786 n.8).
The court looked to the D.C. Circuit ruling in United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. &
Eng'g Inc. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng'g Inc., 214 F.3d
1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that the claimant must show that certification was
a prerequisite to government payment)).
210. Harrison, 176 F.3d at 786 n.8.
211. Hererra, 91 Fed. Appx. at 865 n.3.
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(3) United States ex reL Godfrey v. KBR21 2
In Godfrey, the relator alleged that KBR violated the False Claims Act by
paying inflated invoices submitted to it by subcontractors and then seeking
payment from the government based on these increased payments.2 13 The
court agreed with the Harrison court that express certification was operative
when the defendant failed to comply with conditions that served as
prerequisites to obtaining a government payment.214 The court rejected
Godfrey's allegation of implied certification.2 15
f. Fifth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc.2 16
In Steury, the relator alleged that the defendant submitted a false or
fraudulent claim within the meaning of the FCA by accepting payment
from the government after selling the Veteran Administration an unsafe
intravenous fluid infusion device.217 The court noted that it had never
previously adopted the theory of implied certification and that it did not
need to decide that issue here because the relator had failed to provide
sufficient allegations for implying false certification.218 The court
distinguished between mere breaches of contract and claims under the FCA
that have a prerequisite requirement.219 The court made an important
distinction when it failed to recognize this prerequisite requirement as part
212. United States ex rel. Godfrey v. KBR, 360 Fed. Appx. 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
213. Id. at 408.
214. Id. at 411-12 (citing Harrison, 176 F.3d at 786).
215. Id. The court, referring to its analysis in Harrison, said, "Godfrey did not allege that
LOGCAP, the contract between KBR and the government, made payment contingent on
compliance with any particular conditions, nor did he allege any facts to support his
conclusory assertion that KBR in fact certified compliance." Id. The court also looked to the
Seventh Circuit in emphasizing that when false certification is alleged, certification must be a
condition of the government's requirement for payment. Id. (citing United States ex rel.
Gross v. AIDS Research Alliance-Chi., 415 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2005)).
216. United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2010).
217. Id. at 266.
218. Id. at 268. The court noted that it had previously declined to adopt implied false
certification in United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos. Inc. Id. (citing United States ex rel.
Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2008)).
219. Id. "We have thus repeatedly upheld the dismissal of false-certification claims
(implied or express) when a contractor's compliance with federal statutes, regulations, or
contract provisions was not a 'condition' or 'prerequisite' for payment under a contract." Id.
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of the materiality prong of the FCA.220 While noting that the definition of
"material" had been broadened,2 2' the court said that the claim must first be
analyzed as to "whether it is fair to find a false certification or false claim for
payment in the first place."222 The court concluded that "a false certification
of compliance, without more, does not give rise to a false claim for payment
unless payment is conditioned on compliance."223
The court found that in this case the government's payment for the
intravenous infusion device was not conditioned on Cardinal Health's
compliance with the warranty of merchantability.22 4 The relator did not
allege that the contract between the parties contained a warranty of
merchantability, and the court narrowly construed the applicable
regulation.225 The court did say that a knowing delivery of defective goods
to the government or a knowing attempt to deceive the government about
the nature of commercial items may violate the FCA.226
220. Id. at 269.
221. Id. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 ("FERA") defines "material"
as "a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of
money or property." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
222. Steury, 625 F.3d at 269.
223. Id. The court went on to say:
As already discussed, when payment is not conditioned on a certification of
compliance, it is not fair to infer such certification from a mere request for
payment. Similarly, even if a contractor falsely certifies compliance (implicitly
or explicitly) with some statute, regulation, or contract provision, the
underlying claim for payment is not "false" within the meaning of the FCA if
the contractor is not required to certify compliance in order to receive
payment.
Id. "As we have recognized in the past, whether payment is conditioned on compliance will
depend on the specific statutes, regulations, and contracts at issue in a particular case." Id. at
271 n.4.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 269-70. The relator referred the court to the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR)(48 C.F.R. § 12.404(a)). Id. at 269. The court notes that under the FAR the government
has as remedies the right to accept the noncompliant item, initiate price reduction or replace
the noncompliant item. Id. "That the government may accept (and pay) for noncompliant
commercial items under the FAR confirms that payment is not conditioned on compliance
with the warranty of merchantability." Id. at 270.
226. Id. at 270. United States v. Aerodex, Inc. is an example of such a case decided by the
Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972). In Aerodex,
false claims liability was assessed against a manufacturer of ball bearings, who knowingly
supplied non-conforming goods to the government. Id. at 1006. Aerodex, Inc. claimed that
although the ball bearings did not meet the agreed specifications, it supplied the military
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g. Sixth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs.227
Century Health Services ("Century") established an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP) and named two of its top officers as the plan's
trustees. 228 Century was eligible for reimbursement of ESOP funds by the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). 229 Based on submissions
made by Century, in which it certified compliance with the applicable rules
for reimbursement, it received money from HCFA, deposited the money,
and immediately withdrew the money from the ESOP accounts. 23 0 The
trustees failed to replace the promissory notes with appropriately valued
stock.23'
The court's precedent cases broadly construed the meaning of "false or
fraudulent" claims.232 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's analysis
with the same basic performance characteristics as a conforming product. Id. Aerodex did
not deny that the bearings it supplied to the government were reworked versions of another
bearing which rendered the two indistinguishable to the naked eye. Id. at 1008. Industry
standards allowed either ball bearing to be used in the specific engine that was the subject of
the contract. Id. The court, nevertheless, found that Aerodex's deliberate mislabeling of a
part specifically named in the contract compelled a finding of liability under the FCA. Id. at
1012. The court also found that Aerodex breached its express warranty to supply the specific
ball bearing called for in the contract. Id. The court stated that it was irrelevant that
government inspectors had initially failed to inspect the bearings before accepting and
installing them. Id.
227. United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., 289 F.3d 409 (6th Cir.
2002).
228. Id. at 411.
229. Id. at 412.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 413. For example, in the Sixth Circuit case of United States ex rel. Compton v.
Midwest Specialties, Inc., the contract specifically called for testing to be conducted on the
brake shoes that Midwest was to supply for Army vehicles. See United States ex rel. Compton
v. Midwest Specialties, Inc., 142 F.3d 296, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1998). Midwest was aware of an
express production-testing requirement and knowingly violated it. Id. at 304. The court
ruled that this was an FCA violation because the "manufacturer knowingly supplies
nonconforming goods to the government, based on a belief that the nonconforming goods
are just as good as the goods specified in the contract." Id. The court found that the Army's
consequential damages were equal to the entire contract price, since all of the brake shoes
had to be removed after they were found to be nonconforming. Id. at 304-305. The court
*said that "the general rule recognized in the Uniform Commercial Code [is] that a buyer may
reject goods outright' if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to
the contract."' Id. at 305. The court then concluded, "[w]e stress that the government did not
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of implied certification-the defendants impliedly certified compliance with
Medicare regulations governing reimbursement for ESOP contributions by
knowingly filing false cost reports.m The defendants alleged that the claims
were not expressly false when they were filed and therefore did not satisfy
this aspect of FCA analysis.3 The court disagreed, holding that "liability
can attach if the claimant violates its continuing duty to comply with the
regulations on which payment is conditioned. We adopt this theory of
liability [implied certification], and conclude that the district court did not
err in finding it applicable in this case." 235
(2) Chesborough v. VPA, P.C.2 36
In Chesborough, the relator, a radiologist, provided x-ray interpretation
services to the defendant, a home health provider. Chesborough alleged
that VPA filed false or fraudulent claims because the tests "were either not
properly documented as to indication, were performed with equipment that
did not conform to industry standards, or were administered by
inadequately trained radiology technologists."238 The court noted that
Chesborough was not bringing these claims because "VPA expressly
certified that its studies complied with industry standards." 239 The court
noted that situations do occur when FCA liability exists for failure to
comply with a regulation.240
Chesborough did not identify a specific Medicare or Medicaid regulation
indicating compliance was required but generally stated that "appropriate
diagnostic testing on Medicare beneficiaries" was indicated for proper
reimbursement.24 ' The court did not accept this as a sufficient standard for
implied certification.4
bargain only for plug-welded brake shoes that could withstand a certain amount of force;
they also bargained for the confidence that comes with a product that has been subjected to
production testing." Id. at 305 n.8.
233. Augustine, 289 F.3d at 414-15.
234. Id. at 415.
235. Id.
236. Chesborough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011).
237. Id. at 464.
238. Id. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 468.
242. Id. In this 2011 case, the Sixth Circuit reiterated its holding from United States ex rel.
Augustine v. Century Health Serys., Inc., embracing the concept of implied certification. Id.
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(3) United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc.243
In this Eastern District of Kentucky case, arising from the Sixth Circuit,
the United States became aware of potential violations of Medicare and
Medicaid claim violations after state officials investigated potential criminal
neglect at the Villaspring owned nursing homes.2 " The court agreed that
the United States had properly pleaded implied certification because the
government appropriately alleged that Villaspring had violated its Medicare
provider agreement.245
h. Seventh Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Abner v. Jewish Hospital Health Care
Servs., Inc. 24 6
In this Southern District of Indiana case, arising in the Seventh Circuit,
the relators alleged healthcare fraud via billing irregularities by their
(citing United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th
Cir. 2002)). In accepting the "prerequisite to payment standard" the court stated:
Under that theory, it is not the violation of a regulation itself that creates a
cause of action under the FCA. Rather, noncompliance constitutes actionable
fraud only when compliance is a prerequisite to obtaining payment. Thus, a
relator cannot merely allege that a defendant violated a standard-he or she
must allege that compliance with the standard was required to obtain payment.
Id.
243. United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43-DCR, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 145534 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011).
244. Id. at *2-*3.
245. Id. at *22. When Villaspring enrolled in Medicare it was required to submit a form
(HCFA-855) in which it agreed to a certification statement. Id. The language of the
Certification Statement signed [by Bortz] on behalf of Villaspring, provides:
I understand that payment of a claim by Medicare or other federal health care
programs is conditioned on the claim and the underlying transaction
complying with such laws, regulations and program instructions ... and on a
provider/supplier being in compliance with any applicable conditions of
participation in any federal health care program.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court decided that based on
this language it was reasonable for the government to assert that a violation of a Medicare
statute or regulation could give rise to liability under an implied certification theory. Id. at
*22-*23.
246. United States ex rel. Abner v. Jewish Hospital Health Care Servs., Inc., No. 4:05-cv-
106-RLY-WGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 1381816 (S.D. Ind. March 31, 2010), affd sub nom.,
Abner v. Scott Mem'l Hosp., 634 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2011).
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employer hospital.247 The court granted summary judgment for the
defendants because the relators failed to allege that a false claim that was
actually submitted.'
i. Eighth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Kappenman v. Compassionate Care
Hospice of the Midwest, L.L.C. 249
In this district court case from the Eighth Circuit, the relator alleged that
false claims were filed to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services by
her employer Compassionate Care Hospice (CCH), an entity that provided
hospice care.25 The court explained its theory of implied certification
stating that the relator "must show that if the government had been aware
of the defendant's violations of the Medicare laws and regulations that are
the bases of a plaintiffs FCA claims, it would not have paid the defendant's
claims."251 The court found that Kappenman had shown sufficient factual
support that CCH had impliedly certified compliance with Medicare
regulations.252
j. Ninth Circuit
(1) United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz253
In Ebeid, the relator alleged that Lungwitz, who owned three health care
businesses, engaged in the "unlawful corporate practice of medicine" and
247. Id. at*1.
248. Id. at *8-*9. There is no mention of "certification" here. Id. at *8. The Seventh
Circuit has not yet explicitly adopted or rejected implied certification.
249. United States ex rel. Kappenman v. Compassionate Care Hospice of the Midwest,
L.L.C., No. 09-4039-KES, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23020 (D. S.D. Feb. 23, 2012).
250. Id. at *4.
251. Id. at *13. (quoting Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 307 (3d Cir.
2011)).
252. Id. at *14-*15. The Medicare statute related to this implied certification claim stated:
"'[N]o payment may be made under Part A or B of this subchapter for any expenses incurred
for items or services in the case of hospice care, which are not reasonable and necessary for
the palliation or management of terminal illness.'" Id. at *13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1395y(a)(1)(C) (2012)). The court said that this section of the code is an express condition of
payment that links Medicare payments to the requirement that each claim be reasonable and
necessary. Id. at *14-*15 (citing United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
253. United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010).
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that referrals among her businesses were unlawful. 25 Ebeid alleged that
Lungwitz maintained an illegal corporate structure, that the entities
exhibited a prohibited amount of control over physician medical decision-
making, and that they made illegal patient referrals amongst themselves.255
Ebeid claimed that Lungwitz submitted claims to the government for
reimbursement while violating federal rules that were a precondition for
payment.256 The Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted, for the first time, the
theory of implied certification.257 The court looked to the Stark Act and
related Medicare regulations for language to support Ebeid's claim.258
254. Id. at 995.
255. Id. at 995-96.
256. Id. at 996.
257. Id. at 995-96. The Ninth Circuit adopted an implied certification theory most
closely associated with the Second Circuit's ruling in United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus. Id.
at 998. The court said that the ruling in Mikes was most closely in keeping with its precedent
of accepting express certification. Id.; United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d
1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the materiality element of an FCA claim included
certification, which was an assertion relevant to the government's decision to confer a
benefit.); United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that "violations of laws, rules and regulations alone do not create a cause of action under the
FCA[ and that iut is the false certification of compliance which creates liability when
certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit") (emphasis in original).
Despite the generalized agreement with the ruling in Mikes, the court here notes that it
would not specifically decide if in the Medicare context the underlying statute must
"expressly" condition payment on compliance. Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 1001 n.3 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The court said that,
express certification simply means that the entity seeking payment certifies
compliance with a law, rule or regulation as part of the process through which
the claim for payment is submitted. Implied false certification occurs when an
entity has previously undertaken to expressly comply with a law, rule or
regulation, and that obligation is implicated by submitting a claim for payment
even though certification of compliance is not required in the process of
submitting the claim.
Id. at 998.
258. Id. at 999-1001. The court notes that the Stark Act expressly conditions payment on
compliance with the Act: "No payment may be made under this subchapter for a designated
health service which is provided in violation of subsection (a)(1) of [42 U.S.C. §
1395nn(g)(1)]." Id. at 1000 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1)). The court said that this
would have been an effective use of implied certification, had Ebeid pleaded it sufficiently.
Id. Ebeid also pointed to Medicare regulations dealing with home health care and hospice
care. Id. The court agreed with Ebeid that these regulations did provide a precondition for
payment. Id. at 1001. The court said, "we look to the specific text of the regulation, which
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k. Tenth Circuit
(1) Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc.2 59
In Shaw, the relator accused her employer, AAA Engineering and
Drafting, Inc. ("AAA"), of falsely inflating numbers on word orders and
using those numbers to support equitable adjustment claims.2" The relator
also claimed that AAA did not comply with its contractual obligation to
dispose of silver, used fixer, and other photographic chemicals in
accordance with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines.26 ' The
United States, in amicus curiae supporting the relator's claims, said that
AAA had submitted monthly invoices to the government in which it
impliedly certified that it complied with the silver recovery provisions in the
contract.2 62 The court made a clear distinction between the ability of implied
certification to support a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), but not claims
brought under § 3729(a)(2).2 6 ' The court agreed with the lower court that
provides that 'Medicare ... pays for home health services only if a physician certifies and
recertifies' the need for home health care services." Id. (emphasis added) (citing 42 C.F.R. §
424.22 (2012)). "A physician in a prohibited financial relationship may not certify or
recertify such need. Id. "Therefore, certification of compliance with the ban on financial
relationships prohibited under § 424.22(d) may be inferred by the submission of a related
Medicare claim for home health services." Id.
259. Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 2000).
260. Id. at 523. An equitable adjustment claim was a clause in the contract between AAA
and the government that allowed for increased payment if the amount of work performed
was more than contemplated at the time the contract was signed. Id. at 524-25. Certification
theory was not addressed in this aspect of the case. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 531. Since AAA was being paid not only for photographic services but also for
the environmental compliance, the relator stated that AAA implied certification with the
contract's environmental clauses is a violation of the FCA. Id. The court did not discuss
whether implied certification is based here on the contractual violation itself or the
underlying EPA regulations implicit in the contract. Id. It did make reference to a Senate
Committee statement that said false claims under the FCA "may take many forms, the most
common being a claim for goods or services not provided, or provided in violation of
contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 99-345 at 9,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274). Thus, the court infers that implied certification
theory would extend to the underlying "statute or regulation." Id.
263. Id. at 531-32. Because the language of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) requires a "false record
or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved" and § 3729(a)(1) has no
requirement of the "false record or statement," FCA liability arising under implied
certification can only be brought under 3729(a)(1) claims because no "affirmative or express
false statement by the government contractor" is required. Id.
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the relator presented sufficient evidence that AAA knowingly failed to
comply with the environmental aspects of its contract.2 64
(2) United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr.,
Inc.265
In Conner, the relator was an ophthalmologist who claimed the
defendant hospital expressly certified compliance with Medicare law and
regulation and violated those certifications by filing false annual cost
reports.266 Conner claimed that his allegations proceeded under express
certification theory, 67 although he conceded that the Medicare laws do not
contain a condition of compliance within the annual cost report.268 Conner
urged the court to look at the annual cost reports standing alone and find
that they contained explicit certification that conditioned payment on
Medicare statutes and regulations. 269 The court rejected this expansive view
of false express certification and said, "When... the express certification
does not state that compliance is a prerequisite to payment, we must look to
the underlying statutes to surmise if they make the certification a condition
of payment."270 Although Conner proceeded under an express certification
theory that the court rejected, the court recognized its precedents did allow
for implied certification. 271 The court said implied certification is when "the
analysis focuses on the underlying contracts, statutes, or regulations
themselves to ascertain whether they make compliance a prerequisite to the
government's payment." 72
264. Id. at 533.
265. United States ex reL Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir.
2008).
266. Id. at 1214.
267. Id. at 1218.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. The court looked at the annual cost report regulation in 42 C.F.R. 5
413.24(f)(4)(iv) and found it to "contain[] only general sweeping language [that] does not
contain language stating that payment is conditioned on perfect compliance with any
particular law or regulation." Id. at 1219. The court also rejected any sweeping use of implied
certification by saying that a failure to comply with Medicare regulations when supplying
Medicare services was too broad to be supported by implied certification theory. Id. The
court also emphasized the need to distinguish between conditions of the Medicare program's
participation and conditions of payment. Id. at 1220.
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(3) United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc.27 3
In Lemmon, the relator alleged that Envirocare of Utah, Inc.
("Envirocare") violated its contractual and regulatory obligations to the
federal government by improperly disposing of waste.274 The false claims
arose when Envirocare submitted invoices for payment that contained
certifications that it had fulfilled its obligations under the contract. 275 The
court noted that express certification theory makes a claim actionable under
the FCA only if it "leads the government to make a payment which, absent
the falsity, it may not have made."27 6 Here the relator's claims were
reinstated after they had been dismissed at the lower court for failure to
state legally sufficient claims with the requisite specificity.27
The court also assessed Lemmon's claims with respect to implied
certification, referring to the rule in Shaw. "[W]e found that the pertinent
inquiry for such claims is not whether a payee made an 'affirmative or
express false statement,' but whether, through the act of submitting a claim,
a payee knowingly and falsely implied that it was entitled to payment."278 It
found Lemmon's claims were sufficient because Lemmon sufficiently
pleaded the contract-based claims.279
1. Eleventh Circuit
(1) McNutt ex rel. U.S. v. Haleyville Med. Supplies280
In McNutt, the qui tam relator alleged that the defendant, a medical
device supplier, violated the Anti-Kickback Statute by paying pharmacists
for referrals. 281' The parties agreed that compliance with the Anti-Kickback
273. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir 2010).
274. Id. at 1166.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1169.
277. Id. at 1173.
278. Id. at 1169. (quoting Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 532-33
(10th Cir. 2000)). This court assessed implied false certification by determining whether the
government would have paid the claim had it known of its falsity. Id. The Lemmon court also
faulted the lower court for ruling that the plaintiff needed to tie the alleged incidents to
identifiable certification of regulatory compliance. Id. at 1170.
279. Id. The court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded contract-based claims,
and the regulatory breaches had not been exclusively relied upon. Id.
280. McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, 423 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.
2005).
281. Id. at 1258.
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Statute was a condition of payment by the Medicare program because
violation of the statute would be grounds for disqualification from the
program.282 The defendant argued that the government had failed to
identify any false claims." The court stated, "[W]hen a violator of
government regulations is ineligible to participate in a government program
and that violator persists in presenting claims for payment that the violator
knows the government does not owe, that violator is liable, under the Act,
for its submission of those false claims."284
(2) United States ex rel. Freedman v. Suarez-Hoyas 285
In this district court case from the Eleventh Circuit, the relator alleged that
the defendant, a pathologist who owned a pathology laboratory, violated the
Anti-Kickback Statute."' The government alleged that Dr. Suarez-Hoyas
enticed a local dermatologist to refer patients by allowing him to bill
Medicare for the professional component of the reimbursement, despite the
fact that the dermatologist did no work to support this arrangement.287 The
court relied on the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in McNutt2  and agreed with the
government that an Anti-Kickback Statute violation was sufficient to state a
claim for FCA liability based on implied false certification theory.2 89
m. D.C. Circuit
(1) United States v. Science Applications International Corp.290
In this case the government alleged that Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) violated contractual obligations that
required that they "forego entering into consulting or other contractual
282. Id. at 1259.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. United States ex rel. Freedman v. Suarez-Hoyas, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
286. Id. at 1272.
287. Id. at 1273.
288. McNutt, 423 F.3d at 1256.
289. Freedman, 781 F.Supp.2d at 1278-79. The Freedman court states that its theory of
implied certification is that "where the government pays funds to a party, and would not
have paid those funds had it known of a violation of a law or regulation, the claim submitted
for those funds contained an implied certification of compliance with the law or regulation
and was fraudulent." Id. (citing United States ex rel. Barrett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)).
290. United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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arrangements with any firm or organization, the result of which may give
rise to a conflict of interest with respect to the work being performed under
the contract."291 Additionally, the contract required that SAIC certify to
codified regulations that listed relationships that could lead to conflicts of
interest.292 SAIC was hired by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
to provide expertise to support the agency's rulemaking concerning
recycled, radioactively contaminated materials from nuclear facilities.2 93 The
court denied the government's claims with respect to express certification
on two grounds.2 94 First, the reports submitted by SAIC made no reference
to whether the company had complied with conflict of interest
requirements.2 95 Second, the government did not claim that SAIC's
"separate express contractual certifications were themselves request[s] or
demand[s] for money so as to fall within the statute's definition of claim."2 96
This case was decided on implied certification theory.2 97 The court here
adopted what it called the "materiality approach."2 98 It explained that this
approach required the plaintiff to show that "the contractor withheld
information about its noncompliance with material contractual
requirements."'99 The court went on to say, "The existence of express
contractual language specifically linking compliance to eligibility for
payment may well constitute dispositive evidence of materiality, but it is
not, as SAIC argues, a necessary condition.300 The plaintiff may establish
materiality in other ways, such as through testimony demonstrating that
291. Id. at 1262 (quoting the 1992 contract between the government and SAIC).
292. Id. 48 C.F.R. § 2009.570-3(b) lists the potential conflicting "situations and
relationships." Id.
293. Id. at 1261.
294. Id. at 1267.
295. Id.
296. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id. at 1268-71.
298. Id. at 1269-71. The court stated that the approach it adopted was the same as that
adopted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. See Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616
F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614
F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010); Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531-32
(10th Cir. 2000). The court also contrasts this "materiality approach" with the approach
taken by the Second Circuit that "recognized an express condition precedent requirement for
implied certification." Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1269-70 (quoting United
States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001)).
299. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d at 1269.
300. Id.
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both parties to the contract understood that payment was conditional on
compliance with the requirement at issue."o' The court defined materiality
as "evidence that compliance with the legal requirement in question is
material to the government's decision to pay."302 It also stressed that
violations of "minor contractual provisions that are merely ancillary to the
parties' bargain are neither false nor fraudulent."303 In this case, the court
found that SAIC did impliedly certify compliance with NRC regulation, and
the trial court jury found that the contract violations were not minor."
n. Federal
(1) Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States30 s
Ab-Tech Construction, a minority owned business, was awarded a
subcontract by the Small Business Administration (SBA) pursuant to
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.306 In order to qualify under Section
8(a), a firm has to be owned and controlled by "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals."0 ' Ab-Tech signed a "Statement of
Cooperation" in which it expressed understanding of the parameters that
constituted compliance with the program.308 Ab-Tech failed to obtain
approval from the SBA for a subcontracting arrangement they formed with
Pyramid Construction Company and then attempted to conceal the
arrangement.309 Because Pyramid had a "substantial voice" in the project,
the SBA would not have approved the subcontract had it known of the
arrangement.3"0
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1271.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (Fed. Cl. 1994), affd, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
306. Id. at 431-32. The Small Business Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-697c.
307. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6)(A) (1992)).
308. Id. at 432. The regulations of the Section 8(a) program said that termination from
the program would occur if there was "[flailure by the [small business] concern to obtain
prior SBA approval of any management agreement, joint venture agreement or other
agreement relative to the performance of a section 8(a) subcontract." Id. (citing 13 C.F.R. §
124.209(a)(16) (1993)).
309. Id. at 432-33.
310. Id. at433.
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The court stated that the vouchers submitted for progress payments by
Ab-tech were false claims under the FCA because they "represented an
implied certification by Ab-Tech of its continuing adherence to the
requirements for participation in the 8(a) program."1" The court went on to
explain that "Ab-Tech not only dishonored the terms of its agreement with
that agency but, more importantly, caused the Government to pay out
funds in the mistaken belief that it was furthering the aims of the 8(a)
program."3 12 It further explained that the essence of a false claim is
withholding "information critical to the decision to pay." 313
IV. IMPLIED CERTIFICATION AND MATERIALITY
A. Introduction and Premise
It is this Comment's contention that the concepts of "implied
certification" and "materiality" are distinct entities that must be decided by
courts with separate analyses. The belief that implied certification is a
distinct element of the FCA comes partly from revisions to the FCA that are
included within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA). " In the PPACA, Congress has codified the connection of the
Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) to the FCA."' Congress ended any doubt
about this connection by providing that "a claim that includes items or
services resulting from a violation of the [AKS] constitutes a false or
fraudulent claim for the purposes of [the FCA]."316 It should be noted that
this construct does not say that the claim must necessarily be material to the
government's decision to pay-it says that a violation of the AKS is a "false
or fraudulent claim for the purposes of [the FCA]." 31 7 This ended the debate
about this issue that dated back to Pogue"' in 1996 and was still raging in
311. Id. at 434.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
315. Id. at § 6402(0(1).
316. Id.
317. Id. at § 6402(g).
318. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn.
1996).
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Hutcheson' in 2011.320 By ending the debate about the connection of the
AKS to the FCA, Congress has explicitly announced that implied
certification is a distinct element of the FCA, because the connection
between the AKS and FCA is itself based on implied certification. The fact
that a Stark Law violation is now more closely tied to the FCA also bolsters
this view. How could one square the fact that violations of the AKS and
Stark Law are now statutorily linked to FCA liability with the fact that
implied compliance with other statutes and regulations is not?
In 2009, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
(FERA)321 and revised the FCA statute to add "materiality" into 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(B). The definition of materiality is "the natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment of receipt of money or
property" from the government.322 The inclusion of this definition in FERA
shows that Congress meant for courts to retain a materiality component in
FCA analyses. This broad definition of materiality reveals that Congress
meant to allow the courts to broadly construe its meaning. This construct
can also be of great benefit as the courts wrestle with so-called "quality of
care" cases. 323
B. Implied Certification Analysis
In United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., the qui tam
plaintiff alleged that the physicians referred their Medicare and Medicaid
patients to the defendant's hospital in violation of the Anti-Kickback and
self-referral statutes.324 Pogue contended that, even though the claims were
correctly billed and medically necessary, the fact that the defendants
submitted Medicare claims carried the implied certification that they were
complying with all federal statutes related to Medicare, including the
AKS.325
319. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011).
320. See discussion supra Part II.A.1, II.B.1.(a), and III (discussing Pogue and Hutcheson).
321. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
(2009).
322. 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(4) (2012).
323. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty.
Psychiatric Ctrs. of Oklahoma, Inc.).
324. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1508 (M.D. Tenn.
1996).
325. Id. at 1509.
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The Court agreed with Pogue and said that by not disclosing its
violations of the AKS, American Healthcorp demonstrated its intent to
cause the government to pay claims that it would not have paid had it been
aware of these violations.3 26 For the first time, in the context of Medicare, a
court agreed that a provider submitting facially correct claims can still be
held liable under the FCA because of a violation of a second, related federal
statute.327
In United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc.,3 28 the
relator alleged that Blackstone engaged in a nationwide kickback scheme to
induce hospitals and physicians to submit materially false or fraudulent
claims to Medicare.3 29 The relator argued that compliance with the AKS was
a precondition for Medicare reimbursement and that failing to comply with
the AKS made the claims false or fraudulent.330The court rejected this
argument;33 1 however, it also refused to adopt the construct of express or
implied certification as a way of addressing such an argument.' Instead, it
chose to look at this issue by determining if the claim misrepresented
compliance with a precondition of payment and then addressing whether
those misrepresentations were material.333 The court "first address[ed]
whether the claims at issue here misrepresented compliance with a
precondition of payment so as to be false or fraudulent and then
address[ed] whether those misrepresentations were material."334 In this
case, the "misrepresentations" were adequate to trigger FCA liability."'
These two cases-separated by fifteen years-illustrate how courts have
wrestled with implied certification analysis within the context of the AKS. The
326. Id. at 1513.
327. Id.
328. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011).
329. Id. at 378.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 379.
332. Id. at 392.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 392.
335. Id. at 392-93. The court looked specifically at the Provider Agreement and the
Hospital Cost Report Forms that the providers signed as a prerequisite to payment from
Medicare. Id. The Provider Agreement required, inter alia, that the provider "understand
that payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the claim and the underlying
transaction complying with [Medicare's] laws, regulations and programs instructions." Id.
The Agreement specifically mentioned AKS as one of the regulations. Id.
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AKS makes it a criminal offense to "knowingly and willfully" offer, pay, solicit,
or receive any remuneration in connection with referring an individual for
medical items or services for which payment may be made by any federal
health care program, including Medicare and Medicaid.336 Section 6402 of the
PPACA makes two changes to the AKS. 337 The PPACA makes any violation of
the AKS a "false or a fraudulent claim" under the FCA."' No cases have yet to
be adjudicated under this revision of the AKS.339 It will be interesting to see if
courts, especially those that have emphasized a materiality element, interpret
this PPACA provision to mean that the claim is false granting automatic FCA
liability, or whether the AKS violation will render a claim "false" and then
trigger a materiality analysis.340 This Comment argues for the latter method.
Because "implied certification" and "materiality" should be distinct legal
analyses, the PPACA revision to the AKS should satisfy the "falsity" element
only, leaving courts to determine if the violation at hand was material to the
government's decision to pay. This would allow the courts to use the Hutcheson
construct.341 In Hutcheson, the content of the Provider Agreement and Hospital
Cost Reports led the First Circuit to determine that the materiality element was
336. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012),
337. Section 6402 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act amends the Social
Security Act by inserting after section 11281 a new section called 1128J. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Section
1128J(f)(1) is named "Kickbacks" and reads:
Section 1128B of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b) is amended by
adding at the end of the following new subsection: (g) In addition to the
penalties provided for in this section or section 1128A, a claim that includes
items or services resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or
fraudulent claim for the purposes of subchapter III of chapter 37 of title 31,
United States Code. The other change to the AKS is to the intent requirement
that is outside the scope of this Comment.
Id. (emphasis added).
338. Id. at § 6402(f)(1).
339. See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011). The court in Hutcheson mentions the revision to the AKS made in the PPACA. Id. at
392. The court characterized the changes in the PPACA as "establish[ing] that AKS
compliance is, without more, a precondition to Medicare payment." Id. The court then
refused to address the case before it in light of this revision. Id. The court held that the
Provider Agreement and Hospital Cost Reports that Blackstone had submitted contained
sufficient identification to the AKS to make it clear that violation of the AKS was a
precondition of payment. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 392-97.
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satisfied.3 42 Nevertheless, one can envision scenarios where a court determines
that the AKS has been violated but the materiality element is not clear. In these
cases the court should undertake a separate materiality analysis.
The Stark Law forbids a physician from referring to an entity, for a
designated health service, if the physician has a financial relationship with
that entity, and the entity may not present a Medicare claim for payment as
a result of a prohibited referral.343 If the entity violates the Stark Law and
receives a payment, a so-called overpayment has occurred.344 The FERA
provision known as the "reverse false claims provision" says,
[A]ny person who ... knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be
used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay
or transmit money or property to the Government or knowingly
conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government... .345
The term "obligation" is defined as "an established duty, whether or not
fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or
licensor-licensee relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from
statute or regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment...346 The
term "obligation" is now defined to mean "overpayment," which links the
FCA reverse claims provision more directly to Stark. 4 ' Thus, there is a link
342. Id. The First Circuit notes that the Provider Agreement drafted by CMS specifically
identifies the AKS as one of the two enumerated examples of "laws, regulations and program
instructions." Id. at 392-93. The court concluded that "[tihis language makes it clear that the
federal Medicare program will not pay claims if the underlying transaction that gave rise to
the claim violated the AKS." Id.
343. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012); see also 42 C.F.R. § 411.350-389.
344. 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(g)(2) (2012) ("If a person collects any amounts that were billed in
violation of [the Stark Law], the person shall be liable to the individual for, and shall refund on a
timely basis to the individual, any amounts so collected."). See also 42 C.F.R. 411.353(d) (2012).
345. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012) (emphasis added). Note that the pre-FERA reverse
claims provision did not contain the term "material" or "obligation." See 31 U.S.C.
3729(a)(7) (2012).
346. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
347. Before FERA, high dollar amount settlements were reached that linked 31 U.S.C.
3729(a)(1) and (a)(2) to the Stark Law. See United States ex rel. Moilan v. McAllen Hosps. L.P.,
No. M-050-CV-263, (S.D. Tex 2009); United States ex rel. Reimche v. Tulare Local Healthcare
Dist., No. CV 08-00543CAS, (C.D. Cal.). Moilan was settled on October 30, 2009 for $27.5
million. See Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Texas Hospital Group
Pays U.S. $27.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Oct. 30, 2009),
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between the Stark Law and the FCA that was strengthened by the FERA
revision of the reverse claims provision.
The PPACA has also more closely linked the Stark Law to the FCA."'
Under the "Reporting and Returning of Overpayments" section, the
"Enforcement" provisions establish that "any overpayment retained by a
person after the deadline for reporting and returning the overpayment
[under paragraph 2] is an obligation.""'
These revisions are evidence that Congress has sought, through FERA
and the PPACA, to strengthen the link between the FCA and both the AKS
and the Stark Law.350 The implication is clear: Congress meant to codify the
element of "implied certification" needed to link these laws and, by
reference, has retained implied certification theory as a viable and
continued element of FCA analysis.
C. Materiality Analysis
The continued usage of a materiality analysis is less controversial. In
determining whether a claim or statement is false or fraudulent, most courts
have required an additional factor commonly known as "materiality" in
order to find liability under the FCA. There is a circuit conflict over the
proper test for materiality that essentially falls into two groups: (1) those
that required a higher standard of materiality (the "prerequisite to
payment" test)..' and (2) those that required a lower standard ("natural
tendency to influence" test).352
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/October/09-civ-1175.html. Reimche was settled for $2.4
million in July of 2009. See Press Release, United States Attorney's Office, Central District of
California, Tulare Health Agencies Agree to Pay Over $2.4 Million to Settle Civil Lawsuit Alleging
False Medicare Claims (July 27, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/pr2009/
087.html. Both Moilan and Reimche were typically linked via the Medicare Hospital Cost Report
Certification form, CMS Form 2552.
348. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(d), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
349. Id. (referring to 31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(3)).
350. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
351. The "prerequisite to payment" test is most commonly associated with the Second
Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, where the court held, "Specifically,
implied false certification is appropriately applied only when the underlying statute or
regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order
to be paid." United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001).
352. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012). This language is taken directly from the FERA
definition of "material." Id. Material is defined as: "having the natural tendency to influence,
2014] 495
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, the Second Circuit provided the
classic "prerequisite to payment" test for materiality, which was dependent
on whether the claim "specifically[] implied certification is appropriately
applied only when the underlying statute or regulation upon which the
plaintiff relies expressly states the provider must comply in order to be
paid."" In United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River
Co., the Fourth Circuit applied a lower standard, which based materiality on
the "potential effect of the false statement when it is made.""
This Comment urges that the "materiality" standard adopted by a court
should first be cleanly severed from its implied certification analysis. Then,
the court should recognize that when Congress enacted FERA it meant to
lower the "materiality" standard. Therefore, courts should adopt the
"natural tendency to influence" test.
D. "Quality of Care" Cases
Courts should also consider using the implied certification construct and
the broader "materiality" standard as a means of assessing so-called "quality
of care" cases. For example, in Mikes, the court considered the plaintiffs
worthless services claim." The court said, "An allegation that defendants
violated the Act [FCA] by submitting claims for worthless services is not
predicated upon false certification theory. Instead, a worthless services
claim asserts that the knowing request of federal reimbursement for a
procedure with no medical value violates the Act irrespective of any
or capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property." Id. Many courts
have interpreted this definition as strongly limiting FCA liability to false statements that
directly affect the government's payment decision, and several courts have held that
violations of "conditions of participation" in a federal healthcare program did not result in
FCA violations. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'l Health Ctr., Inc., 543
F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2008) (adopting the "prerequisite to payment" standard); United States
ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Mem'1 Health Care Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 972 (W.D. Tenn. 2007)
(holding that non-compliance could lead to exclusion from participation in Medicare but
this would not effect current payment of claims).
353. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699. In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, the
Supreme Court indicated that FCA liability under Section 3729(a)(2) required a showing of
"materiality," and that a false statement must be a "condition of payment" in order to satisfy
this materiality requirement. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S.
662, 662-64 (2008).
354. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 2003).
355. Mikes, 274 F.3d 687 at 702-04.
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certification."5 6 The Mikes court adopted the same paradigm as the court in
United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc.,m3 7 holding that "a
worthless services claim is a distinct claim under the Act. It is effectively
derivative of an allegation that a claim is factually false because it seeks
reimbursement for a service not provided."'3
But what of claims under the FCA that are not "worthless," but are of
diminished quality? Do these represent factually false claims, and how
should they be assessed? In United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community
Psychiatric Centers of Oklahoma, Inc.,"' the government claimed that
Community Psychiatric Centers (CPC) was liable under the FCA by not
providing its patients with a "reasonably safe environment" and for
"submitting bills, [in which] CPC implicitly certified that it was abiding by
applicable statutes, rules and regulations requiring provision to patients of
appropriate quality of care a safe and secure environment."360 The court
rejected CPC's assertion that it could not abide by the "vague standards"
found in the governing rules.36 1 The court stated that "a problem of
measurement should not pose a bar to pursing an FCA claim against a
provider of substandard health care services under the appropriate
circumstances."3 62 The court then viewed this as a problem of materiality,
although it did not explicitly use that term. It stated, "[S]tatutes and
regulations governing the Medicaid program clearly require heath care
providers to meet quality of care standards, and a provider's failure to meet
such standards is a ground for exclusion from the program."3 63 Thus, once
determining that the services were not worthless, the Aranda court used an
356. Id. at 702.
357. United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2001).
In Lee the relator alleged that the defendant who operated clinical laboratories falsified
laboratory test data. Id. at 1050.The Ninth Circuit held that a worthless services claim was
the most appropriate way to assess this scenario. Id. at 1053. The court held that certification
theory was not necessary in assessing worthless services claims. Id.
358. Mikes, 274 F.3d 687 at 703.
359. United States ex rel. Aranda v. Cmty. Psychiatric Ctrs. of Okla., Inc., 945 F. Supp.
1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
360. Id. at 1487.
361. Id. at 1488.
362. Id.
363. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7(b)(6)(B), which states that the secretary may exclude anyone who furnishes patient services
"of a quality which fails to meet professionally recognized standards of health care." Id.
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implied certification analysis and then a materiality analysis.3" The court
used a three-prong path of analysis. First, was the service that was rendered
worthless?365 Second, did CPC impliedly certify compliance with the
relevant statutes and regulations that govern health care quality in
psychiatric centers (implied certification analysis)?366 Third, was the quality
of care so inferior that had government known of the substandard care it
would not have paid the claim or excluded the entity from participation in
the program (materiality analysis)?... This Comment deems this to be the
proper path of analysis. By separately analyzing the "materiality" of a claim
the court is able to assess a question that is very different than the question
posed by implied certification.
V. CONCLUSION
In the "Introduction," this Comment presented the hypothetical
healthcare defense attorney who was faced with the prospect of defending
his client, a large pharmaceutical company, against allegations that it failed
to comply with regulations that were not explicitly part of its contract.368 In
United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc.,3 69 the defense won the first
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1488-89.
366. Id.
367. Id. Compare the analysis in Aranda to the analysis in United States ex rel. Swan v.
Covenant Care, Inc. United States ex rel. Swan v. Covenant Care, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1212
(E.D. Cal. 2002). In Swan, the relator alleged that Covenant Care (CC) falsified records to
conceal inadequate care at their nursing homes. Id. at 1216. The court first assessed whether
this represented a worthless services claim. Id. at 1221. It held that it was not worthless
because CC was paid on a per diem basis and not per services basis. Id. The court then
purported to assess the false certification status of the claims and noted that the Ninth
Circuit had not adopted this form of implied certification. Id. The Swan court held that,
under United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, "regulatory violations do not give rise to a viable
FCA action government payment is expressly conditioned on a false certification of
regulatory compliance." Id. at 1266 (citing United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d
1261 (9th Cir. 1996)); United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001).
Thus, the Swan court does not do a separate "implied certification" and "materiality"
analysis in this quality of care case. Swan, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1221-22.
368. See discussion supra Part I.
369. United States ex rel. Rostholder v. Omnicare, Inc., No. CCB-07-1283, 2012 WL
3399789, at *1 (D. Md. August 14, 2012). In a confusing opinion, the court sought to analyze
the claim by invoking implied certification analysis followed by materiality. Id. at *13-14
(noting that the Fourth Circuit had not yet adopted the implied certification doctrine). The
court then stated that Rostholder, at oral argument, asked the court only to consider the
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battle. It will be interesting to see how cases like Rostholder will fare in
circuits with a more delineated implied certification theory.370 This
Comment urges courts that hear these cases to rigorously apply implied
certification analysis to the claim and assess materiality in a separate and
distinct manner.
"traditional materiality test of the Fourth Circuit." Id. The court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at *15.
370. See case briefs supra Part III (in particular, note cases from the Second, Third, Sixth,
Ninth, Tenth and DC circuits with strongly implied certification theory). See also supra note
1.
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CHART 1. CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT STATUS OF FALSE CERTIFICATION:
EXPRESS CERTIFICATION
FIRST CIRCUIT: Rejects certification construct.
United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone, 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011).
New York ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 652 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.
2011), cert. denied, No. 11-363 (R46-005), 2011 WL 4403614 (U.S. Dec. 27,
2011).
SECOND CIRCUIT: An expressly false claim is one that certifies
compliance with a statute, regulation, or contract term where compliance is
a prerequisite to payment.
United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
THIRD CIRCUIT: Express certification is falsely certifying compliance
with regulations, which are prerequisites to claim for payment.
United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 554 F.3d 88 (3d Cir.
2009).
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295
(3d Cir. 2011).
FOURTH CIRCUIT: When a government program requires compliance
as a prerequisite to a benefit or payment and there is failure to comply,
there is false certification to induce the benefit.
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776 (4th Cir.
1999).
United States ex rel. Godfrey v. KBR, 360 Fed. Appx. 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
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FIFTH CIRCUIT: A false or fraudulent claim is when a claimant falsely
certifies compliance with applicable statutes or regulations.
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125
F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 1997).
United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262 (5th
Cir. 2010).
SIXTH CIRCUIT: A claim is fraudulent if it expressly states that it
complies with a particular statute, regulation, or contractual term that is a
prerequisite for payment and does not so comply.
Chesborough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: FCA claims based on false certification of
compliance with a statute or regulation requires that it be a condition of or
a prerequisite to government payment.
United States ex rel. Gross v. Aids Research Alliance-Chi., 415 F.3d 601
(7th Cir. 2005).
United States ex rel. Yannacopoulos v. Gen. Dynamics, 652 F.3d 818 (7th
Cir. 2011).
EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Express false certification requires proof that the
certifications were conditions of payment and had the government known
would have refused to payment.
United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet 639 F3d 791 (8th Cir. 2011).
NINTH CIRCUIT: False certification creates liability when certification
is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit.
United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 1996).
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United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.
2006).
TENTH CIRCUIT: Express certification applies when there is false
certification of compliance with a statute, regulation, or contractual term
where compliance is a prerequisite to payment.
United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'1 Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163
(10th Cir 2010).
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT:
No applicable cases.
D.C. CIRCUIT: Express false certification occurs when a claimant
explicitly represents that he has complied with a contractual term and in
fact has not.
United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 143
(D.D.C. 2011).
FEDERAL CIRCUIT:
There are no applicable cases in this circuit.
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CHART 2. CIRCUIT BY CIRCUIT STATUS OF FALSE CERTIFICATION:
IMPLIED CERTIFICATION
FIRST CIRCUIT: Rejects the construct but recognizes that the condition
of payment may be implied in statutes, regulations, or other sources.
United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone, 647 F.3d 377 (1st Cir.
2011).
SECOND CIRCUIT: Implied certification occurs when a statute
expressly conditions payment on compliance with a given statute or
regulation.
United States ex rel. Mikes v. Strauss 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
United States ex rel. Kirk v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 601 F.3d 94 (2d
Cir. 2010).
United States ex rel. Feldman v. City of New York, 808 F. Supp. 2d 641
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
THIRD CIRCUIT: Implied certification liability attaches when claimant
seeks payment without compliance with regulations that affect eligibility for
payment.
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295
(3d Cir. 2011).
FOURTH CIRCUIT: Has not accepted implied certification theory. If the
theory is valid it only is to the extent that submission for reimbursement
constitutes certification of compliance with the terms of the particular
government program.
United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453
(4th Cir. 1997).
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United States ex rel. Hererra v. Danka Office Imaging Co., 91 Fed. Appx.
862 (4th Cir. 2004).
United States ex rel. Godfrey v. KBR, 360 Fed. Appx. 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
FIFTH CIRCUIT: Has not accepted implied certification theory. The act
of submitting a claim for reimbursement implies compliance with
governing federal rules that are preconditions of payment.
United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262 (5th
Cir. 2010).
SIXTH CIRCUIT: Implied certification exists even if the claim was not
expressly false when it was filed. Violations can exist if payment is
conditioned on continuing duties to comply.
United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health Servs., 289 F.3d 409
(6th Cir. 2002).
Chesborough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Villaspring Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 3:11-43-DCR,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145534 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 2011).
SEVENTH CIRCUIT: Has not accepted or rejected implied certification
theory.
Abner v. Jewish Hosp. Health Care Servs., Inc., No. 4:05-cv-106-RLY-
WGH, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 1381816 (S.D. Ind. March 31,2010).
EIGHTH CIRCUIT: Has not accepted or rejected implied certification
theory.
United States ex rel. Kappenman v. Compassionate Care Hospice of the
Midwest, L.L.C., No. 09-4039-KES, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23020 (D. S.D.
Feb. 23, 2012).
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NINTH CIRCUIT: Implied certification occurs when a claimant
expressly undertook to comply with a law, rule, or regulation and submits a
claim for payment and that obligation is implicated by submitting a claim
even though certification of compliance is not required.
United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010).
TENTH CIRCUIT: The pertinent inquiry is whether through the act of
submitting a claim a payee knowingly and falsely implied that it was entitled
to payment.
Shaw v. AAA Eng'g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 2000).
United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg'I Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d
1211 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163
(10th Cir 2010).
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: Has not directly addressed implied certification,
but held that there can be a false claim without an express statement.
McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, 423 F.3d 1256
(11th Cir. 2005).
United States ex rel. Freedman v. Suarez-Hoyas, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1270
(M.D. Fl. 2011).
D.C. CIRCUIT: To show that a claim is false or fraudulent on basis of
implied certification, the plaintiff must show contractor withheld
information about its noncompliance with material contractual terms.
United States v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT: Has not addressed the concept of implied
certification but has held that a claim implies continuing compliance with
the requirements of participation and can be false without an express
statement.
Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (Fed. Cl. 1994),
affd, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
